Abstract-Pressed by market globalization and concomitant competition, more and more manufacturers are relying on their suppliers to provide raw materials and component parts so as to focus on their core competence. As a result, the coordination of activities across a network of suppliers becomes critical to quickly respond to dynamic market conditions. In this paper, a novel framework combining mathematical optimization and the contract net protocol is presented for make-to-order supply network coordination. Interactions among organizations are modeled by a set of interorganization precedence constraints and the objective is to achieve the organizations' individual and shared goals of fast product delivery and low inventory. These interorganization constraints are relaxed by using a set of interorganization prices that represent marginal costs per unit time for the violation of such constraints. The overall problem is thus decomposed into organizational subproblems, where individual organizations schedule their activities based on their internal situations and interorganization prices. Coordination is achieved through an iterative price-updating process carried out in a distributed and asynchronous manner. With prices dynamically updated and schedules adjusted, this approach coordinates activities to fulfill existing commitments while maintaining agility to take on new orders. Numerical testing results show that interorganization prices converge and prices may change as new orders arrive to reflect the new pressure on deliveries. The method thus provides a novel framework for activity coordination across a supply network and answers in a quantitative manner the perennial question, "Time is money, but how much?"
market globalization and concomitant competition, more and more manufacturers are relying on their suppliers to provide raw materials and component parts so as to focus on their core competence. As a result, the coordination of activities across a network of suppliers becomes critical to quickly respond to dynamic market conditions [1] . Activity coordination involves proper scheduling and synchronization of activities within and across organizations for fast product delivery and low inventory, assuming that quality and cost aspects are satisfied. It is particularly important for "make-to-order" supply networks, since their flow of materials is triggered by dynamic customer orders and there is little work-in-process inventory to buffer coordination inefficiencies.
Effective coordination, however, is difficult, since activities may be related in a complex way and a delay of one activity may have a domino effect on activities linked through precedence relationships or through sharing of common resources. Most coordination problems, when formulated mathematically, are NP-hard optimization problems and the computational requirements to obtain an optimal solution increase drastically with problem size. In addition, supply networks generally operate in a dynamic environment, as the arrival of an urgent order may trigger a chain of events causing existing commitments to be compromised. Furthermore, organizations generally have their own private information and decision-making authority. Effective coordination methods must be developed without accessing others' private information or intruding on their decision-making authority.
In this paper, a novel approach, combining mathematical optimization and the contract net protocol, is presented for make-to-order supply network coordination. In the formulation, each organization has its own information and decision-making authority, and interactions among organizations are modeled by a set of interorganization precedence constraints. The objective is to achieve the organizations' individual and shared goals of fast product delivery and low inventory over a specific planning horizon as presented in Section III. Motivated by the pricing mechanism for the coordination of resource allocation, these constraints are relaxed by using a set of interorganization prices. These prices are Lagrange multipliers associated with interorganization constraints (as opposed to multipliers associated with resource constraints in traditional resource allocation problems) and represent marginal costs per unit time for the violation of such constraints. The overall problem is, thus, decomposed into organizational subproblems, where individual organizations schedule their activities based on their internal situations and interorganization prices without accessing others' private information or intruding on their decision-making authority.
Coordination is achieved through an iterative price-updating process carried out in a distributed and asynchronous manner as presented in Section IV. With prices dynamically updated and schedules adjusted, this approach coordinates activities to fulfill existing commitments, while maintaining agility to take on new orders. Numerical testing results presented in Section V show that interorganization prices converge and these prices may change as new orders arrive to reflect the new time pressure on order deliveries. The method provides a novel structure for activity coordination and answers in a quantitative manner the perennial question, "Time is money, but how much?"
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
In most multiagent approaches, coordination among agents is carried out by exchanging information and imposing constraints using rule-based methods [2] , [3] , [11] . A commonly used framework is the contract net protocol, which was originally developed for distributed problem solving by mimicking the human contract negotiation process [10] and has then been extended for supply chain coordination. For a two-tier supply chain with a manufacturer (contract manager) and its potential suppliers (contractors), it works as follows.
Upon receiving an order from its customer, a manufacturer announces requests for bids for raw materials or component parts to its potential suppliers. Part specifications and requested delivery dates are included in the requests for bids. -Potential suppliers check their own status and submit bids to the manufacturer.
-
The manufacturer selects bids based on the announced criteria and awards contracts to the suppliers selected.
The selected suppliers send acknowledgments back to the manufacturer and abide by the contracts to deliver the raw materials or component parts. The above process mimicks the interactions among organizations in a supply chain. The resulting contracts generally are binding and there is no flip-flop of decisions once contracts are settled. For a multitier supply chain, a supplier may further announce requests for bids and award contracts to its own suppliers.
To meet various requirements in supply chain coordination, the original contract net protocol has been extended. In the mediated constraint relaxation approach of Beck and Fox [3] , a mediator, an additional agent, was introduced to gather information and to form a constraint graph. This mediator is also responsible for resolving conflicts among agents via constraint relaxation. An approach that combines a contract net protocol-based bidding mechanism with a mediation method under a multiagent framework was presented in [9] . A hierarchical agent architecture was presented in [8] , where agents were organized hierarchically. Low-level agents are responsible for short-term planning and scheduling within individual facilities, and high-level agents are responsible for overall strategic and tactical decisions. A time-bound negotiation framework was developed in [7] , where a qualified bid should be selected within a specified amount of time.
In the above methods, coordination is generally performed in an ad hoc manner following some prespecified rules. The quality of solutions is problem specific and cannot be easily quantified. Furthermore, it is difficult to adjust the contracts to accommodate dynamic changes such as the arrivals of urgent new orders.
The above limitations can be overcome if appropriate architecture and methods are developed. Important lessons can be learned from the market economy, where prices play a key role in coordinating the decentralized allocation of resources. A recent example is the use of machine prices for job shop scheduling for a separable model [12] , [14] . The key idea is decomposition and coordination, where decomposition is achieved by relaxing coupling machine capacity constraints using soft prices or Lagrangian multipliers, and coordination is accomplished through the iterative updating of prices to adjust operation beginning times. Numerical results show that near-optimal schedules can be obtained for problems with up to 50 000 operations within a reasonable amount of computation time on a Pentium III 500-MHz PC [14] . This price-based coordination idea has been extended to coordinate multiple cells in a factory [6] . In that problem, the relationships among cells are modeled as intercell precedence constraints, and these constraints are relaxed by using a set of intercell prices, which are similar to but distinct from prices for resource allocation. The overall problem is, thus, decomposed into cell-level subproblems, which, in turn, are solved by using the price-based scheduling methods described above. Coordination across cells is achieved through the iterative adjustment of intercell prices by an additional coordinator in a centralized and synchronous manner without accessing individual cells' local information or intruding on their decision-making authority.
A planning model for distributed manufacturing was presented in [13] . The model is a multicommodity network model where each commodity represents a product to be produced by a network of facilities. A Lagrangian relaxation approach was developed to decompose the problem into a number of single-product, multifacility subproblems and a resource subproblem to generate near-optimal plans.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The goal of this paper is to present a new framework and the corresponding approach to optimize activity coordination among organizations in a make-to-order supply network. In the following, a price-based coordination architecture is first presented in Section III-A, and the mathematical formulation for a snapshot problem is presented in Section III-B.
A. System Architecture 1) Price-Based Coordination Architecture: Organizations in a supply network may be divisions within a company or different companies, and they may be organized in a hierarchical or heterarchical manner. Since they are mostly autonomous or semiautonomous with private information and individual decision-making authority, centralized models and methods are not suitable to coordinate their activities. A decentralized optimization model integrated with the contract net protocol will, therefore, be established. In the model, organizations are represented by autonomous and cooperating decision makers, and interactions among them are modeled by a set of interorganization precedence constraints.
After an organization received an order (or a tentative order related to a request for bids), it checks its bill of materials. Potential suppliers of raw materials or component parts are then identified. A bidding process similar to that of the contract net protocol is carried out where bids are solicited, appropriate suppliers are identified, contracts are awarded, and deliveries are coordinated. On top of this contract net protocol, prices associated with interorganization precedence constraints are used to coordinate activities across organizations. In the process, each organization solves its scheduling subproblem by optimizing its objective function (which is its own objective modified by penalty terms depending linearly on interorganization prices, see (12) below) subject to its internal resource capacity and operation precedence constraints. To coordinate activities across organizations, these prices are iteratively updated based on the degrees of constraint violation. In the view that organizations may have a wide range of computing and communication capabilities, a centralized and synchronous price updating mechanism is not appropriate. Coordination is, therefore, carried out by a distributed and asynchronous price-updating mechanism. In this way, suppliers are selected and delivery dates are determined and coordinated for overall system performance. A simple network with two end customers, one manufacturer, and two suppliers is depicted in Fig. 1 , where the manufacturer has three divisions.
2) Coordination Process: To be more specific, consider the case where an organization received a request for bids containing a requested delivery date, and decides to submit a bid containing a tentative delivery date. This date is determined through solving the organization's scheduling subproblem. In the process, two kinds of orders are considered: orders already under contracts (contracted orders), and orders in response to requests for bids (tentative orders). For contracted orders, one option is to freeze their schedules to avoid missing their contracted due dates. The lack of flexibility, however, may lead to inefficient resource utilization and the failure to submit competitive bids for new requests for bids. In our approach, existing schedules can be modified, however, with stiff penalties for missing the due dates. In this way, resources can be more efficiently utilized and bids can be submitted with competitive tentative delivery dates. An iterative process is then carried out across organizations to reconcile the requested delivery dates and tentative delivery dates while optimizing system-wide performance. If an organization's tentative delivery date cannot meet its customer's requested delivery date, the associated interorganization price is increased based on the degrees of constraint violation. In this way, the increased price forces the organization to provide an earlier tentative delivery date for the next iteration, and at the same time, adds pressure to the customer to consider a later requested delivery date. This price is similarly adjusted by the customer organization. To avoid two organizations adjusting the same price at the same time, a "token" is introduced for each such price and is circulated between these two organizations. Only the one holding the token can adjust the price. Deliveries of contracted orders may also be adjusted through a similar price-updating process.
When prices are close to convergence, the customer organization selects an appropriate supplier for each request for bids. The selected supplier's tentative delivery date then becomes its promised delivery date and the organization's requested delivery date becomes the order's due date. This mechanism is depicted in Fig. 2 . Upon the arrivals of new orders or upon unexpected disruptions, rescheduling is triggered and another cycle of the price-updating process is carried out. The detailed derivation of the coordination process will be presented in Section IV after a snapshot problem is formulated next.
B. Problem Formulation
Consider a decentralized formulation for a snapshot of the problem. It starts with the description of individual organizations based on [12] and [14] , followed by a description of interactions across organizations, and then, the overall objective.
1) Formulation of Individual Organization Problems:
Variables: Suppose that there are organizations in the supply network and Organization has orders to be scheduled. Among , let the subset of tentative orders be denoted as and the subset of contracted orders be denoted as . The th ( ) order of Organization is denoted as ( ) and is associated with an order or a request for bids ( , ) of a customer organization . To simplify the notation, will be denoted as and ( , ) as ( , ) when there is no confusion. A tentative order ( ) ( ) is associated with a given requested delivery date specified by , and a contracted order ( ) (
) is associated with a given due date imposed by . Order ( ) may consist of a set of operations specified by its process plan. In addition, it may need raw materials or component parts, each associated with a request for bids. Let the set of bids received for the th ( ) raw material or component part of ( ) be denoted as . Order ( ) may, therefore, be associated with an order or a tentative order ( , ) of a supplier organization . To simplify the notation, will be denoted as and ( , ) For simplicity, but without loss of generality, it is assumed that the production of ( ) can only start after all the required raw materials or component parts have been received, the transportation times for such deliveries are negligible, and only one supplier will finally be selected for each request for bids.
Organization internal constraints: For each organization, internal constraints include operation precedence constraints, operation processing requirements, and resource capacity constraints.
1) Operation precedence constraints. Each order may consist of a set of operations as specified by its process plan. An operation cannot be started until all its preceding operations have been finished. 2) Operation processing requirements. Each operation should be processed by a specified set of resources for a particular duration of time. 3) Resource capacity constraints. The utilization of a resource should be less than or equal to the capacity of that resource for each time interval. A resource may be a machine type or a class of operators. Details of the above constraints can be found in [12] and [14] , and for brevity, they will not be elaborated here. We shall simply highlight two versions of operation precedence constraints internal to and relevant to our derivation here. First, ( ) cannot be delivered until its last operation has been completed, plus possibly a required slack time. For , this is (1) where is the order completion time (the completion time of its last operation) and is the required slack time. For , this is (2) Second, can only be started after all the required materials or component parts have been received (as internally characterized by the requested delivery date ) plus possibly a required slack time, i.e., where is the order beginning time (the beginning time of its first operation), and the required slack time. Similarly, for , this is (4) Organization objective functions: Assuming that quality and cost aspects are satisfied, an organization in a make-to-order environment wants to ensure on-time delivery of orders while minimizing its inventory. The objective function considered is, therefore, a weighted sum of order tardiness and earliness penalties following [12] and [14] . For , the tardiness is defined as , and earliness , where is the desired release date calculated, for example, based on the and the required processing times. The cost for ( ) is a weighted sum of quadratic tardiness and linear earliness penalties, 1 i.e. (5) where parameters and are nonnegative penalty coefficients. As shown in Fig. 3 , represents the importance of on-time delivery, and the importance of low work-inprocess inventory.
For , the cost is similarly defined, except that tardiness is calculated with respect to its due date (as opposed to ), i.e.,
. In addition, a step penalty for missing the due date is added (6) where equals one if , and zero, otherwise. This last term represents a stiff penalty to discourage the violation of the due date as shown in Fig. 4 .
The objective function of Organization is then the sum of penalties for all its orders (7) 2) Formulation of the Overall Problem:
Interorganizationprecedenceconstraints: Interorganization precedence relationships impose constraints across organizations. For , the tentative delivery date should be less than or equal to the requested delivery date specified by , i.e.
(8)
For
, the original tentative delivery date became the promised delivery date , and the requested delivery date became the order's due date . The due date, however, may not be met during rescheduling in view of disruptions caused by urgent new orders or other uncertainties. For coordination purposes, a new promised delivery date and a new requested delivery date are, therefore, established subject to the following constraint: (9) For each of the above interorganization constraints (8) and (9), a token is established to determine whether or should update the corresponding interorganization price. Only the organization holding the token can update the price, and the token is exchanged between and .
Overall objective function: For the benefit of the entire supply network, the overall objective function is assumed to be the sum of individuals' objectives (10) Different objective functions can be considered to reflect different aspects of supply network coordination. The only requirement is that the functionshould beorganization-wise additive.Organizations in a supply network, however, could have conflicting goals. Although maximizing the total welfare of member organizations is a sensible thing for many cases, this may not be reasonable when the objectives of organizations are too far apart. This case, however, is out of the scope of this paper.
As the above formulation is developed in a bottom-up fashion, it is a decentralized model. From another point of view, the formulation is "separable," since the interorganization constraints (8) and (9) that couple organizations together and the overall objective function (10) are organization-wise additive. A decomposition and coordination approach will be developed next.
IV. SOLUTION METHODOLOGY

A. Overview
Through relaxing interorganization constraints by using "soft" prices or Lagrange multipliers, the overall snapshot problem can be decomposed into a set of subproblems, one for each organization. An organization solves its own subproblem by using, for example, the Lagrangian relaxation technique [12] and [14] based on the information received from customers and suppliers and obtains a schedule for both contracted and tentative orders. For the subset of orders whose tokens are held by the organization, the associated prices are updated based on the degrees of interorganization precedence constraint violation. The organization then sends the resulting requested delivery dates, tentative or promised delivery dates, as well as new prices and tokens, to its suppliers and customers and waits for their responses. After the organization received new information from suppliers or customers and the corresponding tokens, the subproblem is resolved, prices are readjusted, and the process continues until interorganization prices are close to convergence. Suppliers for tentative orders are then selected from possibly multiple potential suppliers based on their tentative delivery dates and the corresponding prices. In view that interorganization precedence constraints (8) and (9) have been relaxed in the iterative optimization process, subproblem solutions, when put together, may not constitute a feasible solution. Heuristics based on mutually agreed-upon rules are thus applied to generate a feasible schedule across the network satisfying (8) . A tentative order then becomes a contracted order, with its supplier's tentative delivery date becoming the promised delivery date, and the corresponding requested delivery date becomes the order's due date. In addition, an extra step penalty is added to the cost to discourage missing the due date. Upon the arrivals of new orders or upon unexpected disruptions, rescheduling is triggered and another cycle of the price-updating process is carried out. In rescheduling, most decision variables are reoptimized except the due dates, which remain fixed unless agreed upon by both organizations involved. This dynamic process, including snapshot problem solving and rescheduling, is summarized in Fig. 5 , and the derivations of specific steps are presented next.
B. Problem Decomposition
To solve the snapshot problem, the "hard" interorganization precedence constraints (8) and (9) are first relaxed by using "soft" prices or Lagrange multipliers. Let be the price between ( ) and ( ), the relaxed snapshot problem is given by (11) subject to internal constraints of all organizations. In view of the separability of the original formulation, the relaxed problem can be decomposed into subproblems, one for each organization. Collecting all the terms related to Organization in (11), the subproblem for is given by (12) , shown at the bottom of the page, subject to the internal constraints of Organization . In (12), ( ) is to be delivered to as a component part of ( ) and is associated with due date and price . Similarly, ( ) requires the delivery of ( ) from , with as the associated price. If has multiple potential suppliers providing bids for the th raw material or component part, then each one is associated with such a price as will be explained at the end of the next subsection.
C. Individual Organization Decision Making
With the above decomposition, subproblem (12) for is to minimize its objective function, which is its original objective (7) modified by penalty terms depending linearly on prices, subject to 's internal operation precedence, resource capacity constraints, and operation processing requirements. For , the decision variables are the beginning times of various operations, tentative delivery date to be offered to its potential customer , and requested delivery date to be imposed on its potential supplier . The decision variables are similar for , with tentative delivery date replaced by promised delivery date . This subproblem is similar to a job-shop scheduling problem and is NP-hard. Although many methods can be used to solve it, the Lagrangian relaxation technique of [12] and [14] is selected since it can efficiently obtain near-optimal solutions and is consistent with the interorganization price coordination framework. In the method, the coupling resource capacity constraints are relaxed by using another set of Lagrangian multipliers, which are "intraorganization prices" for resource utilization. Details of the method can be found in the references, and we shall only comment on how to select suppliers.
Suppose that is seeking a supplier from the set of bids received, , for the th raw material or component part of tentative order ( ). When (12) is solved, these bids are considered one at a time, with the corresponding cost for ( ) calculated by using dynamic programming as presented in [12] . The potential supplier with the minimal cost is then selected to obtain the solution for (12) . At the convergence or near-convergence of the interorganization price-updating process, the tentative order ( ) associated with the minimal order cost is selected and assumed fixed during rescheduling unless agreed upon by both organizations.
D. Coordination Procedure and Convergence
As described earlier, interorganization prices are iteratively updated to coordinate activities across organizations. Given a price vector that includes all the interorganization prices, i.e., (13) the dual problem is given as (14) where is the optimal value of the relaxed problem (11) . An optimal that maximizes is denoted as (15) An effective method to solve such a dual problem is the "surrogate subgradient method" [15] . In contrast to traditional subgradient methods where all the subproblems are optimally solved to obtain a subgradient direction to update the multipliers, this method solves only a subset of subproblems to obtain a surrogate subgradient direction which forms an acute angle with the direction toward . A step size is then selected to ensure that moves closer to . In the current framework, a price component is adjusted by the two associated organizations based on their subproblem solutions. Since not all the subproblems are solved at the same time, surrogate subgradients, as opposed to subgradients, are available. In addition, since subproblems are solved in a distributed and asynchronous manner, a distributed and asynchronous version of the surrogate subgradient method needs to be developed. In the following, the distributed and asynchronous surrogate (12) Fig. 6 . Price components moving to optima. subgradient method for price updating is first presented. It will be shown that by appropriately updating price components, will converge to and is maximized. The selection of step sizes in algorithm implementation is then addressed.
1) Overview of Price Adjustment Process:
Consider the price-adjustment process between and . In view that there could be multiple interorganization precedence relationships between and , let such prices form a vector , which is a component of . This is updated by either or , and its optimum,
, is a component of . In view of communication delays, at time may have delayed knowledge of up to time only, with . It is assumed that the total asynchronism assumption [5, p. 430] holds, i.e., all price components are updated infinitely often and old price information is eventually purged from organizations. This implies that for any given time , there exists a time such that for all , for all and . To present the updating of price components, consider that possesses the token to update at time , and thus, . At time , may have delayed knowledge of prices between and its customers or suppliers other than , i.e., , where is a customer or suppler of and . The updating completes at time . Assume that can be updated toward its optimum along a proper direction based on delayed , then the overall distance between and is reduced from to . This can be shown by an example in Fig. 6 , where for simplicity, price vector has two scalar components, and . In the figure, is also changed from to by during the updating of . As the dual function is concave and the dual problem (14) is subject to positive orthant constraint only, the updating can be performed iteratively without being trapped at a local maximum or terminated prematually. In addition, as the method uses subgradients only, there is no need for global information such as Hessian in the Newton method. Consequently, by iteratively updating individual price components as presented next to their optima, the distance between and will be continually reduced until converges to .
2) Distributed and Asynchronous Surrogate Subgradient Method: Consider that is updated by at time . Similar to the synchronous surrogate subgradient method, the updating of is along the surrogate subgradient direction, i.e.,
In the above, is the step size and is a surrogate subgradient representing the degree of constraint violation. For , the component of is given by (17) following (8) and for , is given by
The updating in (16) is to reduce the distance between and the optimal , and requires to form an acute angle with the direction toward , i.e.
Assuming that (19) can be evaluated by . If it holds, a positive step size is taken, satisfying
It will be proved in Proposition 1 that moves closer to . If (19) is not satisfied, a null step is taken, i.e. After updating, tentative delivery dates for tentative orders, promised delivery dates for contracted orders, , and the corresponding tokens are sent to . In order for to evaluate (19) and to compute its own step size, the subproblem cost of is also sent to , and the process will then be carried out by .
To ensure convergence, it is required that proper directions satisfying (19) can be found so that the distance between price vector to is reduced until is reached. In addition, to implement the method, organization needs to evaluate and determine the step size. Due to communication delays, this is performed based on the delayed price information, e.g.,
. In Section IV-D.3, it will be shown that converges to by appropriately updating price components following (16)-(21), where (19) is satisfied for at least one component under the total asynchronism assumption. In Section IV-D.4, the evaluation of (19) and the calculation of step size in the absence of will then be presented based on a two-organization problem involving and , where the problem is formulated based on the delayed price information.
3) Convergence of the Price Adjustment Process: In the following, Propositions 1 and 2 provide the conditions for price components to move closer to their optima. Proposition 3 shows that these conditions are satisfied for at least one price component under the total asynchronism assumption, so that the distance from to is reduced until is reached. Theorem 1 then establishes the convergence of to . Proof: See Appendix III. Proposition 3 implies that there exists at least one price component satisfying (19) to have a positive step size so that moves closer to until is reached. The above three propositions lead to the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Under the total asynchronism assumption, the distributed and asynchronous surrogate subgradient algorithm presented in (16)-(21) converges, i.e., converges to .
4)
Step-Size Selection: To practically implement the method, one has to evaluate (19) and select a step size following (19)-(21). In view that is unknown, needs to be approximated by or . This is similar to the difficulties faced by most subgradient or surrogate subgradient methods. However, the approximation in the distributed and asynchronous surrogate subgradient method needs to be performed componentwise, without the knowledge of and with communication delays. To do this, a separate dual function is first found, so that is its surrogate subgradient. Using the following property of surrogate dual presented in [15] (27) where is a surrogate dual of , then can be approximated by . To obtain , a new two-organization problem focusing on or will be formulated with delayed price information from customers and suppliers. It will be shown that the subproblems of this new problem are the same as the original subproblems for and ; and is a surrogate subgradient of , the associated dual function. The value can then be approximated by using (27), where and are computed or approximated based on subproblem solutions of and .
Two-Organization Problem: Suppose that is updated by at time . A snapshot two-organization problem for and is defined by freezing the prices other than held by and (28) where is similar to in (12) except that all the terms involving are excluded, and other prices ( ) take delayed values used in updating , i.e., and . Similarly, is defined for . Problem (28) is subject to the interorganization precedence constraints between and and constraints internal to and . To solve this problem, the interorganization constraints between and are relaxed by using , and the relaxed problem is given by (29) where is given by (12) and is similarly defined. With a token introduced, it is clear that this relaxed problem can be decomposed into two subproblems, one for and the other for , and these two subproblems are the same as the original subproblems for or . The dual function of is then defined as
with the surrogate dual denoted as . In view that the subproblems related to (30) are the same as the original ones, is a surrogate subgradient of .
Step-Size Selection: To approximate based on (27), consider and . The term can be evaluated by based on subproblem costs of and , and can be approximated by an upper bound, e.g., a feasible cost obtained by using heuristics for the two-organization problem (28) (additional communication between and may be needed for the heuristics). Let denote the approximate value of the left-hand side of (27), i.e.
(31) then the step sizes can be obtained as if (32) if (33) where is a parameter satisfying .
5) Feasible Solution and Rescheduling:
At the convergence or near-convergence of the interorganization price-updating process, tokens are terminated and prices are fixed. Tentative orders then become contracted orders, with their tentative delivery dates becoming promised delivery dates, requested delivery dates becoming due dates and extra step penalty functions for missing order due dates added to cost functions. Note that subproblem solutions, when put together, may not represent a feasible schedule across the network since interorganization constraints have been relaxed. To obtain a feasible solution, heuristics based on mutually agreed rules and subproblem solutions are used. In the heuristics, if the tentative delivery date of the selected supplier for a particular request for bids is larger than the requested delivery date, the customer organization adjusts its schedule by using the heuristics of [14] , so that the particular order starts later than the tentative delivery date plus possibly a required timeout. Similar is done if the promised delivery date for a contracted order is larger than the requested delivery date. This process is applied across the network from upstream suppliers to the downstream customers. Since dual costs are lower bounds to the optimal cost, the quality of a schedule for a snapshot problem can be quantitatively evaluated by comparing its cost with its dual cost. In view that prices are updated in a distributed and asynchronous manner, however, the true dual cost is not readily available. To obtain a dual cost, the subproblems of all organizations are solved once, based on the same set of prices at convergence. The evaluation should, nevertheless, be carefully done, since the objective function has been changed when tentative orders are converted to contracted orders.
Upon the arrivals of new orders or upon unexpected disruptions, rescheduling is triggered, new tokens created, and another cycle of the price-updating process is carried out. In view that the prices can be initialized at their previous values, convergence should be fast. The process for a three-tier network consisting of a manufacturer and its customers and suppliers is summarized in Fig. 7 .
With prices dynamically updated and schedules adjusted, this approach tries to fulfill existing commitments while maintaining agility to take on new orders. Since prices represent the sensitivity of the overall cost with respect to interorganization precedence violations, they are marginal values of a time unit for the early or late delivery of orders. These prices thus reflect the pressure on order delivery and provide quantitative and dynamic answers to the old question, "Time is money, but how much?"
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND TESTING RESULTS
The method presented above has been implemented on a network of PCs. Each organization is associated with a dedicated computer and equipped with the Lagrangian relaxation-based scheduling method of [14] in C++. The communications across the network is implemented in Java. Three examples are presented below.
Example 1: This example is to illustrate the convergence of the distributed and asynchronous price-updating method. Consider a four-tier supply network as shown in Fig. 8 . There are four organizations with a total of ten "network orders," each involving two or three organizations. In addition, each organization may have its own "local orders" with no suppliers or customers within the formulation. The total number of orders per organization ranges from eight to ten, each containing three to five operations. In the implementation, two Pentium III 700-MHz and two Pentium II 400-MHz PCs are used, one per organization.
The convergence of interorganization prices is shown in Fig. 9 . In view that multiple PCs of different speeds were used and communications were not optimized, 180 interorganization price iterations took 3.4 min.
Example 2:
This example is to demonstrate that prices serve as coordination signals in a dynamic setting and to compare the performance of our approach with that of the "contract net only" approach. In the example, there are three organizations as shown in Fig. 10 .
At the beginning, Organization 1 has four orders and one of them, Order (1, 1), requires a component part to be provided by either Organization 2 or 3. This order is, thus, associated with two prices, one for each potential supplier. Organization 1 later receives two new orders, Orders (1, 2) and (1, 3), at different times. Each of them also requires a component part to be provided by either Organization 2 or 3. Each order, in turn, contains three to five operations. Rescheduling is performed after the arrival of a new order.
The interorganization prices associated with selected suppliers for the three network orders are plotted against the number of iterations in Fig. 11 . It can be seen that the prices converge, although they may change to different values upon the arrivals of new orders. They represent the costs for delaying delivery by one time unit and reflect the pressure on order deliveries. The time to obtain a schedule after a new order arrives is about 2.8 min.
The "contract net only" approach was also implemented within the same framework by fixing interorganization prices to zero and without rescheduling contracted orders. To compare the performance of the two approaches on an equal footing, all costs are recalculated based on the original requested delivery dates and the realized delivery dates without step penalties. The overall cost for the price-based approach is 16 323, whereas the cost for the contract net only approach is 18 946, 12% higher than that of the price-based approach.
Example 3:
This example is to demonstrate the performance of our approach for a larger problem and to compare it with that of the "contract net only" approach. There are four organizations as shown in Fig. 12 . At the beginning, Organization 1 has 99 orders and nine of them require component parts to be provided by Organization 2. To produce these component parts, Organization 2 needs to select Organization 3 or 4 as its supplier for each bid. Organization 1 later receives eight new orders at two different times, four at each time. Each of them also requires a component part to be provided by Organization 2, which in turn needs Organization 3 or 4. Each order may contain three to five operations and rescheduling is performed after the arrival of a new batch of orders.
The overall cost for the price-based approach is 25 834 770, whereas the cost for the "contract net only" approach is 28 529 142, which is 10% higher than that of the price-based approach. The computation time to obtain a schedule is about 48 min, where a significant amount of time is used to set up data structures and for I/O operations and the time to solve an organization subproblem is about 28-40 s.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a novel approach combining mathematical optimization and contract net protocol is presented for make-to-order supply network coordination based on a decentralized model. Activity coordination is carried out in a distributed and asynchronous manner without accessing others' private information or intruding on their decision-making authority, and the convergence of the price-updating method is established. With prices dynamically updated and schedules adjusted, this approach optimizes fulfilling existing commitments while maintaining agility to take on new orders. Achieving this balance may be a key to survival and profitability in today's time-based competition. In addition, since prices represent the sensitivity of the overall cost with respect to interorganization precedence violations, they are marginal values of a time unit for the early or late delivery of orders. These prices thus reflect the pressure on the delivery of orders with wide managerial implications and provide quantitative and dynamic answers to the perennial question, "Time is money, but how much?" 
APPENDIX II
Proof of Proposition 2
From the procedure of price updating, we know that Organization updates from to and then sends to Organization . As the updating follows (19)-(21), we have based on Proposition 1.
Q.E.D.
APPENDIX III
Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose that for all . Then from Proposition 1, step sizes for all price components should be zero for all because a positive step size will lead closer to . Since all old price information will eventually be purged from organizations under the total asynchronism assumption, there exists a such that the price component held by each organization at takes value from . Consequently, a surrogate subgradient becomes a subgradient at time and according to the definition of subgradient [4, p. 711] Since is not an optimal solution to the dual problem, . As , , , is a part of , it follows that there is at least one that satisfies 
